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Email: E.Kanterian@kent.ac.uk 
[Moore 2012 develops a helpful distinction between good and bad metaphysics. 
Employing this distinction, I argue, first, that some contemporary metaphysical 
theories might be ÔbadÕ, insofar as they employ, unreflectively, concepts akin to 
KantÕs Ideas of reason. Second, I investigate the difficulty Kant himself has with 
explaining our craving for bad metaphysics. Third, I raise some problems for KantÕs 
doctrine of Ôtranscendental cognitionÕ, which rests on the difficult assumption that 
Ideas have objective reality. I conclude that while Kant has given us means to combat 
certain bad metaphysics, his own philosophy is not entirely free of it either.] 
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Kant writes in the antinomies section of the first Critique: Ônothing is left except to 
reflect on the origin of this disunity of reason with itself, on whether a mere 
misunderstanding might perhaps be responsible for it, after the elucidation of which 
perhaps both sides will give up their proud claims, but in place of which reason would 
begin a rule of lasting tranquility over understanding and the sensesÕ (B492f.)
1
. 
The prospect and promise of this peaceful reign is repeated a number of times in the 
Doctrine of Method. Since reasonÕs internal conflict rests on a misunderstanding, 
once this is removed, peace will ensue, even if at the price of diminished 
metaphysical pretentions. But has Kant fulfilled his promise? Has he guided us into 
the safe haven of good metaphysics, or is there some bad metaphysics in KantÕs 
 2 
account of good metaphysics? And is the root of reasonÕs division against itself really 
based merely on a misunderstanding?  
The distinction between good and bad metaphysics plays a central role in Adrian 
MooreÕs engaging chapter on Kant in The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics. As he 
explains, Kant agreed with Hume that much of what had been considered metaphysics 
hitherto had to be thrown out, for failing to make sense or for failing to be warranted 
by experience (p. 109)
2
. So the questions urged upon us by our metaphysical drive 
were either pseudo-questions or unverifiable. Moreover, old metaphysics had not 
even managed to agree on a procedure to attempt an answer to such questions, unlike 
mathematics (p. 110).
3
 But this is where KantÕs agreement with Hume ends. For the 
sceptic Hume threw the baby of metaphysics out with the dirty bath-water of pseudo-
metaphysics. Indeed, seen from KantÕs point of view, Hume offered some bad 
metaphysics himself, for he was unable to account for metaphysical issues such as the 
principle that every event in nature has a cause, or for mathematical necessity (p. 
111). As Kant points out in the Doctrine of Method, HumeÕs own scepticism had no 
proper justification.
4
 Hume was a Ôgeographer of human reasonÕ who thought to quell 
the burning questions of metaphysics by locating their source beyond the limits of 
human reason, without being able to account for those very limits (B788).  
In what follows, Moore develops KantÕs account of synthetic a priori knowledge and 
the correlated doctrine of transcendental idealism. This doctrine needs to embrace 
seemingly conflicting motives (if knowledge is knowledge of something independent 
of it, how can it be a priori? if it is a priori, how can it be synthetic, i.e. not purely 
conceptual? if it offers us metaphysical insight, how is it not a form of old 
metaphysics about experience-transcendent things?). Moore argues that Kant manages 
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the remarkable and original feat of bringing these motives into a coherent whole, 
explaining transcendental idealism in terms of the metaphor of the (ÔnativeÕ) 
spectacles, which affect only how we see things, not which things we see (pp. 121f.). 
While these spectacles donÕt allow us to know how things are in themselves, in 
accounting for the nature of these very spectacles in terms of synthetic a priori 
propositions (obtained by transcendental proofs of the conditions necessary for having 
the experience we do), Kant is involved in the most general attempt to make sense of 
things, which, on MooreÕs definition, is just what metaphysics is (pp. 123f.).
5
 
Metaphysics thus understood is simply a priori knowledge of what we can know, via 
an analysis of our cognitive faculties, undertaken in the Aesthetic and Analytic. Kant 
himself allows of such a conception of metaphysics in The Architectonic of Pure 
Reason (B870ff.). Of course, in its disunity against itself reason is not troubled by this 
sort of metaphysics, but by questions about the existence of God, the immortality of 
the soul, the freedom of the will and the origin and nature of the world. Our 
elementary metaphysical instinct is not concerned with knowing what we can know, 
but knowing the ultimate essence of things, of the greatest things. As Moore puts it: 
Ômetaphysicians most deeply aspire to ... synthetic a priori knowledge of things in 
themselvesÕ (p. 125), i.e. Ôsynthetic a priori knowledge without appeal to intuitionsÕ 
(p. 124). Since we humans can only have intuition-based knowledge, it follows that 
metaphysicians aspire to attain something contradictory, synthetic a priori knowledge 
which is not synthetic.  
Leibniz would have been surprised to be told that in his metaphysics he was really 
aiming for synthetic a priori knowledge, given that Leibniz took metaphysics to 
investigate necessary truths, which are proven by the method of analysis (i.e. the 
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proof of identities by means of progressive substitution of complexes with their 
simple elements).
6
 And Frege, in the nineteenth century, will not only be surprised by 
the suggestion, but explicitly deny that his ontological investigation into the nature of 
numbers is based on synthetic a priori truths, or aims for such truths; to the contrary, 
number statements are logically derivable from the laws of logic, and hence analytic, 
but still about numbers, which are non-physical and non-psychological entities. Our 
knowledge of numbers is analytic, but does rest on our grasp, i.e. intuition, of logical 
entities like judgeable contents, functions, extensions (Frege 1979: 7, 1984: 300; 
Gabriel 2000: 31f.). That we have a logical, and thus non-sensible, intuition was also 




We may wonder what Kant might reply to these rationalists. Presumably, he would 
reply that they misunderstand what they are doing. Leibniz has simply misclassified at 
least some necessary truths as analytic, as Kant argues for example with respect to the 
principle of sufficient reason, a pillar of LeibnizÕs metaphysics (B246). Frege was 
guilty of a similar misclassification; few would argue today that HumeÕs Principle, 
required for the original logicist project, is an analytic truth. Kant would surely have 
also objected to the possibility of an Ôawareness of universalsÕ and of Ôcategorial 
intuitionÕ. And what would Kant say about logical entities enjoying high ontological 
currency today, e.g. propositions, possible worlds, functions from possible worlds to 
propositions, and so on? Presumably that talk of knowledge of these entities is based 
either on a confusion between (no matter how abstract) forms of cognition and the 
objects of this cognition, or, alternatively, on a confusion between a category and a 
merely regulative Idea, i.e. on what Kant calls a Ôtranscendental subreptionÕ (B537, 
B610f.). The former alternative is entailed by his doctrine of the categories as mere 
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forms of thought, which are Ôempty concepts of objectsÕ when lacking experiential 
input (B148f., 288, 306ff.). The second alternative is worked out in the Dialectic. 
Take, for instance, the concept of a possible world, the concept of the set of Ôall 
possible worldsÕ,
8
 the concept of Ôabsolutely everythingÕ,
9
 or indeed something 
apparently so innocuous as FregeÕs Latin letters in his concept-script, ranging over 
ÔallÕ judgeable contents (see Frege 1972: ¤11) Ð all these look suspiciously like 
Kantian Ideas. About Ideas Kant says that there cannot be any appearance found 
which represents them in concreto (B595, cf. Prolegomena ¤40, 4: 327). And surely, 
we cannot represent Ôall possible worldsÕ in concreto; there is simply no possible 
experience in which these can be given. It seems legitimate to ask todayÕs 
metaphysicians for a new Ôtranscendental deductionÕ, an account of the possibility of 
our seemingly non-empirical knowledge of these entities. If such a deduction cannot 
be given, we would have some reason to believe that such entities are fictions. In the 
Transcendental Ideal (B599) Kant claims that our concept of an object is guided by 
the so-called principle of thorough determination, according to which we presuppose 
of any object that for all possible predicates F of things and their negations ÂF, that F 
or ÂF must be true of the object (B599f.). This principle, according to Kant, involves 
the concept of the totality of all possibility, and that is an Idea (B601). But an Idea 
does not give us any knowledge about any putative object falling under it. While 
contemporary metaphysics is hardly concerned with proofs about God or the 
immortality of the soul, its assumption that we can refer to and acquire seemingly 
non-empirical knowledge about things like possible worlds etc. might still be 
classified as dogmatic, following Kant. Indeed it might be classified as Ôbad 
metaphysicsÕ in the way specified by Moore, i.e. as an enterprise Ôfailing to have a 
suitable warrant in experienceÕ, or worse, Ôfailing to make senseÕ (p. 109). Could we 
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then not revive KantÕs critical doctrines of the categories and Ideas, stripped of his 
more problematic views, and bring them to bear upon contemporary Ôbad 
metaphysicsÕ? This is one sense in which we can pursue MooreÕs question ÔHow 
might we use [transcendental idealism]?Õ (p. 141) despite the various problems the 
doctrine faces.  
To return to MooreÕs statement that Ômetaphysicians most deeply aspire to synthetic a 
priori knowledge of things in themselvesÕ, we may wonder about another issue. If 
Ônoumenal knowledgeÕ is, in last instance, an impossibility, how is the very aspiration 
to it possible? More precisely, is this aspiration actually intelligible? It is true that 
Kant distinguishes between knowing and thinking (e.g. Bxxvi), and claims that we 
can think far more than we can know (p. 134). But even mere thinking has to obey 
some constraints, in particular the law of contradiction, for Kant writes: ÔI can think 
whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myselfÕ (Bxxvi). But bad metaphysics 
aspires to attain synthetic a priori knowledge which is not synthetic, so it is 
contradicting itself. That would mean that its aspiration is unintelligible, if to aspire to 
X entails that one be able to think X (if asked ÔWhat do you aspire to?Õ, I should be 
able to say, and think, intelligibly, ÔXÕ).  
Moore draws some helpful distinctions in this respect. He makes an initial distinction 
between the scope and limits of metaphysics, i.e. what metaphysics can justifiably 
achieve and what it cannot. The scope is revealed in the Analytic, the limits in the 
Analytic (through the transcendental deduction) and the Dialectic. But the greatness 
of KantÕs account consists not only in tracing the limits, but also in explaining Ôwhy 
we nevertheless feel the urge to make these attemptsÕ of transcending them (p. 125). 
Like Wittgenstein, he does not merely reveal our illusions, but also the logic behind 
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them. As Moore explains KantÕs argument, the questions metaphysicians are tempted 
to ask always involve some Idea of reason. Ill-conceived questions are those which 
involve Ôa confused amalgam of an idea of reason with some concept that can only be 
applied to objects of experienceÕ (p. 126). Such a question has no answer, in the 
intended metaphysical sense. He illustrates this nicely with the example of the 
confused concept of the physical universe as a whole (pp. 126f.). A well-conceived 
question contains no such amalgam, and has an answer, at the level of things in 
themselves (ibid.), but we lack the resources to know it. The question of the existence 
of God, or the immortality of the soul, might be examples of well-conceived 
questions. 
Interestingly, Moore suggests different senses of the irresistibility of metaphysical 
questions. It is irresistible, because natural, for all of us to pose well-conceived 
questions. It is irresistible, because based on specific philosophical 
misunderstandings, for metaphysicians to further pose ill-conceived questions. In both 
cases, it appears, the root illusion persists (p. 129), but the major difference seems to 
be that natural reason expects to know the unknowable, while philosophical reason 
expects to know the nonsensical.  
Is this a fair interpretation? If so, the question still remains as to how we can make 
sense of our aspiration to unavailable knowledge. How can Ôour hopes concern how 
things are in themselvesÕ (p. 132), if we do not have the slightest inkling about them? 
How can hope reach out to the noumenal realm, while knowledge cannot? Moore 
suggests that ultimately there are cracks in KantÕs transcendental idealism, a point he 
demonstrates in his discussion of KantÕs wonderful sphere analogy in the Doctrine of 
Method (pp. 136f., cf. B76ff.). If the surface of the Earth is what we can make 
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empirical sense of, then at any one point in time what we see, standing at a particular 
location, is limited by the horizon. This limit can of course be extended, and is called 
by Kant Schranke (ibid., also Prolegomena ¤57, 4: 351). By contrast, to know what 
we can make sense of, in principle, is to know the dimensions of the EarthÕs surface, 
and that is to know the Grenzen, boundaries, of our (geographical) knowledge, by 
means of some synthetic a priori reasoning, geometry (see B790). But as Moore 
argues, Ôwe can legitimately refer to the limits of a globe only because we have access 
to a dimension other than the surfaceÕs own two [dimensions]Õ (p. 137). Similarly for 
transcendental idealism: this doctrine can only work if it can make sense of the limits 
it claims our knowledge has. But for this we need to make sense not only of what lies 
on our side of the limits, but also what lies beyond, in whatever attenuated sense. And 
Moore points out that transcendental idealism cannot make sense of what lies beyond, 
with its account of transcendental illusion as based on the Ôempty play of our 
conceptsÕ (p. 137, my italics).  
Adding to MooreÕs point, the problem can also be approached from a related aspect. 
In his classification of philosophy in The Architectonic of Pure Reason (B870ff.) 
Kant identifies as one branch of metaphysics Ôin the narrow senseÕ the so-called 
physiology of pure reason (B873), which, as two of its branches, contains the pure 
cognition of the world as a whole and of God, two Ôtranscendental cognitionsÕ. These 
appear to be cognitions answering to well-conceived questions and are not the illusory 
cognitions discussed in the Dialectic.  
But what is this transcendental cognition exactly? Does it amount to mere thinking 
about God and the world? This does not seem to be true, if we follow KantÕs 
distinction (Bxxvi) between erkennen (to cognize, to know) and denken (to think): the 
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Erkennen of an object requires that I can prove its possibility, i.e. the objective reality 
of the corresponding concept, while mere thinking does not require this. It may be 
replied that Kant does not require Ideas to have objective reality. Indeed this is 
implied in various places. Only categories have objective reality, and they do so only 
in combination with the conditions of sensibility, while Ideas are Ôfurther removed 
from objective realityÕ (B595). Since Ideas are devoid of sensibility, if Ideas had 
objective reality, there would be a pure, non-sensory use of concepts yielding 
knowledge of things in themselves (B249f., also B194, 270). All that is needed is that 
Ideas, e.g. the unconditioned, can be thought without contradiction (which is arguably 
one of the major selling points of transcendental idealism; see Bxx). Kant writes in 
the Analytic of Principles: Ôa pure use of the category is possible, i.e., without 
contradiction, but it has no objective validityÕ (A253). And further: Ôthis further 
extension of concepts beyond our sensible intuition does not get us anywhere. For 
they are then merely empty concepts of objects, ... mere forms of thought without 
objective reality...Õ. Our sensible and empirical intuition alone can provide them with 
sense and meaning [Sinn und Bedeutung]Õ (B148). In the curious section on 
nothingness (at the end of the Analytic, B346ff.) Kant characterizes such concepts 
without objects as entia rationis, mere fictions (Erdichtung). 
So it appears that transcendental cognition involves mere thinking (see p. 134), 
coherently but vacuously, about God and the world, mere entia rationis. But this is 
still problematic.  
To begin with, there is a difference between categories and Ideas. Moore explains it in 
terms of different uses of the same thing. Ideas are simply uses of the categories freed 
of their experience-related content. However, despite KantÕs own assertions in this 
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respect (B435), we need to be careful here, for this would make Ideas empty 
categories, lacking objective reality. Kant also says, and needs to say, that Ideas have 
(some sort of) objective reality. Otherwise they would be rather useless for the noble 
purpose he envisages for them. This is why he requires a transcendental deduction for 
them as well, at least to prove that they have some, however indeterminate, Ôobjective 
validity, and donÕt merely represent empty thought-entities (entia rationis 
ratiocinantis)Õ (B697, a claim repeated in Prolegomena ¤40, 4: 327). Even if we 
accept that this objective reality/validity points towards rational faith, we may still 
wonder what this objective reality exactly is. It is clear that Ôobjective realityÕ in this 
context cannot mean what it means in the context of the Analytic, for there it means 
Ôapplication to objects that can be given to us in intuitionÕ (B150f.) or it means, more 
generally, the feature a representation has when it is referring to an object, which 
requires that Ôthe object must be able to be given in some wayÕ (B194). But what does 
it mean in this context? At the end of the Dialectic Kant makes a distinction between 
an objectÕs being given either absolutely or in the Idea (B698). The objective reality 
of the categories relates to the former, that of Ideas to the latter. In the latter case we 
use Ideas to represent objects ÔindirectlyÕ, not to know their properties, but only to 
understand their greatest systematic unity in reason and experience (B698f.). In doing 
so, we derive the objects of experience from Ôthe imagined object of this Idea as its 
ground or causeÕ, which allows us to consider the world as if created by God etc. (cf. 
also B706).  
This is problematic in several respects. First, as Kant also argues, the objects of Ideas 
are mere analogues of real things (B702, 706), which means that the latter are 
required to make sense of the former. But this would involve a circularity, since Kant 
also argues, as just seen, that we derive real objects (objects of experience) from the 
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objects of Ideas. Second, the object of the Idea is described as an imagined object 
(B698) and as a ÔSomething in generalÕ (B706). But the latter is the expression of my 
concept of an object, which is different from my concept of an imagined object.
10
 
Moreover, while I can ÔpositÕ some real object in a context (e.g. assume that there is 
some unfamiliar object in my pocket), it is not clear how I posit the object of an Idea, 
which, given its utmost generality, is devoid of any context, is a real object 
(wirklichen Gegenstand) only as something in general (B705). My reasonÕs giving 
itself this supposed object (B709) is also not the same as my imagining it, for reason 
is surely distinct from imagination, since imagination is the representation of an 
object in intuition without its presence (B151).  
One might reply that the problem concerning the objective reality of Ideas cannot be 
fully solved using the resources of KantÕs theoretical philosophy, but requires an 
engagement with his practical philosophy. Indeed, it is in this context that Kant 
returns to the problem, speaking about the objective, but practical reality of Ideas 
(e.g. Fortschritte, 20: 300), which he also describes as Ômoral-practical realityÕ (Zum 
ewigen Frieden, 8: 416). Our Ideas obtain this reality through the categorical 
imperative, which simply amounts to our acting as if their objects, God and 
immortality, were given, i.e. as if we had knowledge of God and our immortality 
(ibid.).
11
 This is no doubt a crucial move in KantÕs overall project of metaphysics, and 
we may wonder why Moore does not devote more discussion to it.
12
 But it is not clear 
that the move saves Kant from inconsistency. By compositionality, to make sense of 
an Ôas if XÕ construction, we need to be able to make sense of ÔXÕ. Hence, to make 
sense of Ôas if we had knowledge of God and our immortalityÕ, we need to be able to 
make sense of our having knowledge of God and our immortality, i.e. have a coherent 
conception of such a possibility. But we do not, for all (human) knowledge involves 
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sensory intuition for Kant. We would have to be able to make sense of knowledge of 
an object which no experience can give (B709), of knowledge of something about 
which the question whether it is a substance, whether it has necessity, whether it has 
the greatest reality, etc., has no significance (B724). In other words, this would 
require us to make sense of the possibility of knowledge about an object about which 
the question which properties it has lacks significance, which looks like a 
straightforward contradiction.  
The question of how and in what sense Ideas have objective reality is not a minor one. 
Moore quite rightly says: ÔThe whole complex machinery that drives KantÕs 
transcendental idealism ... in fact serves to keep our most important hopes alive. ÒI 
had to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faithÓ (Bxxx)Õ (p. 132). The 
reconciliation between Ôthe demands of Christian morality and the demands of 
Newtonian mechanics is the most important, most profound, and the one to which 
Kant is most ardently committedÕ (p. 132). Kant cannot and does not want to curb our 
aspiration for the higher, for, as he says of his secret metaphysical ally in the first 
Critique: ÔPlato noted very well that our power of cognition feels a far higher need 
than that of merely spelling out appearances according to a synthetic unity in order be 
able to read them as experienceÕ (B370).
13
 But how is this rational faith to be based on 
and motivated by mere fictions, concepts without sense and meaning, empty forms of 
thoughts, especially if we know that they are fictional and empty? How do we even 
distinguish between two concepts without sense and meaning, and what distinguishes 
a concept without sense and meaning from a nonsensical concept, a non-concept? As 
above: How are we able to aspire to and hope for something whose concept is empty 
or worse? How is noumenal hope possible, if the noumenon is a mere limiting 
concept (B310)? How can one aspire to transcendence, if its very concept is a limiting 
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one? The Ideal of reason, i.e. God, is in last instance not even a noumenon, 
inscrutable and unknowable, since it is Ônot even given as a thinkable objectÕ (B642). 
As Ôa mere Idea, it must find its seat and its resolution in the nature of reasonÕ. At the 
same time reason maintains its drive for the infinite, and cannot be repressed to throw 
Ôa glance on the wonders of nature and the majesty of the worldÕs architecture Ð by 
which it elevates itself from magnitude to magnitude up the highest of all, rising from 
the conditioned to the condition, up to the supreme and unconditioned AuthorÕ (B652; 
section on the physico-theological proof). ReasonÕs desire for the absolute appears to 
be struggling here against its own tendency to dissolve its own noble aim. 
In conclusion, it appears that reason, on KantÕs account, remains in disunity with 
itself. The question is whether this is so due to a Ômere misunderstandingÕ, this time 
on KantÕs part, which, once removed, will offer Ôfull satisfactionÕ to reasonÕs 
cognitive drive, as Kant puts it in the last sentence of the Critique of Pure Reason 
(B856), or whether to a more permanent feature of human reason.
14
 The drama of 
metaphysics took a particular twist with Kant, but did not end with him, as Adrian 




 Quotations from Critique of Pure Reason are from Kant 1998, with tacit corrections 
by me where necessary. 
2
 Page references, unless otherwise specified, are to Moore 2012. 
3
 Whether this is an accurate historical characterisation of metaphysics prior to Kant is 
a separate question, which I will not address. Suffice it to say that in the Protestant 
tradition, which was dominant for some 150 years in the German lands, 
metaphysicians would have stressed that they had developed a procedure for 
 14 
 
answering philosophical questions (roughly speaking a Scholastic-Aristotelian 
method with Protestant underpinnings; see e.g. Wundt 1939, 1945). If the reply is, on 
KantÕs behalf, that this procedure was not accepted by all philosophers of the age, e.g. 
not by Cartesians or Spinozists, then this is true for KantÕs own procedure as well and 
indeed true of almost any doctrine in the history of metaphysics.  
4
 However, KantÕs assessment of Hume as Ôcold-bloodedÕ and engaged in a 
scepticism offering no consolation (B773) does not square well with HumeÕs own 
rejection of what he calls Ôexcessive scepticismÕ (cf. Enquiry I:XII:II). It is just that 
Hume, unlike Kant, does not believe that we can put the antinomial conflict of reason 
with itself to rest (B544), and resorts instead to a mitigated form of scepticism.  
5
 But cf. B871f., where Kant rejects a characterisation of metaphysics merely in terms 
of generality. 
6
 Cf. Leibniz 1989: 30ff.  
7
 See Russell 1912:81f., Husserl 1970: 262ff.  
8
 E.g. the set K in Kripke 1963: 84. 
9
 See Williamson 2003. 
10
 The concept of an imagined object presupposes the concept of an object. 
11
 Curiously, in this passage Kant leaves out freedom from his usual tripartite list of 
the objects of metaphysics. 
12
 According to some interpreters, moral philosophy became the true focal point of 
KantÕs metaphysics after the first Critique. See e.g. Pollok 2001: xi-xiv. 
13
 This is claimed even more emphatically in a later essay, ÒWhat Real Progress Has 
Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?Ó (1793/1804; 




 This second option has been extensively explored in the modern age. Hume is one 
example (see note 4 above). Pascal is another: ÔThis is our true state; this is what 
renders us incapable both of certain knowledge and of absolute ignorance. We sail on 
a vast expanse, ever uncertain, ever drifting, hurried from one to the other goal. If we 
think to attach ourselves firmly to any point, it totters and fails us; if we follow, it 
eludes our grasp, and flies us, vanishing for ever. Nothing stays for us. This is our 
natural condition, yet always the most contrary to our inclination; we burn with desire 
to find a steadfast place and an ultimate fixed basis whereon we may build a tower to 
reach the infinite. But our whole foundation breaks up, and earth opens to the 
abyssesÕ (Pascal 1901: 23). For ample evidence of how widespread the motive of the 
Ôweakness of reasonÕ was during the Enlightenment, see Tonelli 1971. 
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